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Abstract 
Recently in Sport, Education and Society, Williams and Manley (2014) argued against the 
heavy reliance on technology in professional Rugby Union and elite sport in general.  In 
summary, technology is presented as an elitist, ‘gold standard’ villain that management and 
coaches use to exert control and by which players lose autonomy, identity, motivation, social 
interactions and expertise.  In this article we suggest that the sociological interpretations and 
implications offered by Williams and Manley may be somewhat limited when viewed in 
isolation.  In doing so, we identify some core methodological issues in Williams and 
Manley’s study and critically consider important arguments for utilising technology; notably, 
to inform coach decision making and generate player empowerment.  Secondly, we present a 
different, yet perhaps equally concerning, practice-oriented interpretation of the same results 
but from alternative coaching and expertise literature.  Accordingly, we suggest that Williams 
and Manley have perhaps raised their alarm prematurely, inappropriately and on somewhat 
shaky foundations.  We also hope to stimulate others to consider contrary positions, or at 
least to think about this topic in greater detail.  More specifically, we encourage coaches and 
academics to think carefully about what technology is employed, how and why, and then the 
means by which these decisions are discussed with and, preferably, sold to players.  
Certainly, technology can significantly enhance coach decision making and practice, while 
also helping players to optimise their focus, empowerment and independence in knowing how 
to achieve their personal and collective goals. 
 
 Keywords: Elite Sports Culture; Empowerment; Professional Judgement and 
Decision Making; Rugby; Technology
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Blaming Bill Gates AGAIN! Misuse, overuse and misunderstanding of performance 
data in sport 
Recently in Sport, Education and Society, Williams and Manley (2014) presented an 
unfavourable argument for the heavy reliance on technology in professional Rugby Union 
and elite sport in general.  Taking a sociological stance towards this ‘occupational crisis’ (p. 
2), the authors based their work on a belief that coaching is at ‘a precarious juncture, where 
the use of advanced technological instruments supersedes human interaction noted as 
instrumental to recent conceptualisations of the coach’ (p. 2).  More specifically, the potential 
for coaching to be conducted as a technocratic, authoritarian and sinister, rather than pastoral, 
activity is portrayed.  Through interviews with four players from one Aviva Premiership 
Rugby Union club (the ‘Ravens’), the authors consequently find apparent support for their 
assertions that ‘gathering data has become a seemingly critical conduit between coaches and 
players in terms of establishing a climate of control’ (p. 2) with players often treated as ‘inert 
human resources’ (p. 2) and ‘by-products of the machine mentality’ (p. 18).  By creating such 
an imbalance of control, coaches are therefore able to use ‘a vice like grip’ (p. 12) and 
marshal players in a regimented, highly analytical and “no excuses” (p. 5) environment.  In 
sum, technology is presented as an elitist, ‘gold standard’ villain that management, or 
‘sovereign technocrats,’ use to exert control and by which players lose autonomy, identity, 
motivation, social interactions and expertise. 
While sociological accounts of coaching practice are useful, we, as scientist–
practitioners, suggest in this Research Forum article that the interpretation and implications 
offered by Williams and Manley (2014) are somewhat limited when viewed on their own.  
Indeed, we suggest that they might represent a somewhat partisan oversimplification or 
misapprehension of how elite environments have operated in the past as well as how they 
tend to work today.  In doing so, we work against a pragmatic philosophy (Giacobbi Jr., 
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Poczwardowski, & Hager, 2005)—which directs our focus towards the practical relevance, 
context and implications of research (Carson & Collins, 2011; Collins, 2014; Cruickshank, 
Collins, & Minten, 2014, 2015)—as well as our belief that coaching is, most fundamentally, 
an exercise in decision making (Abraham & Collins, 2011; Abraham, Collins, & Martindale, 
2006; Nash, Martindale, Collins, & Martindale, 2012).  More specifically, we consider 
important arguments for utilising technology which we hope will stimulate coaches and 
academics to consider the contrary position, or at least to think about this topic in greater 
detail.  To tease apart and challenge Williams and Manley’s fear that technology is likely to 
detrimentally influence, or even has detrimentally influenced, elite sport, our article is 
divided into two parts: Firstly, we identify some core methodological and conceptual issues 
that weaken the authors’ account; second, we present a different, practice-oriented 
interpretation of the same results but from alternative literature.  Our intention in this second 
part is not to detract from Williams and Manley’s level of concern but rather to raise 
awareness towards perhaps equally worrying yet underrepresented issues.  To be clear, we do 
not suggest that there is not currently a problem with some uses of technology in sport (at all 
levels of participation) or with some coaches, but rather that greater and broader 
considerations are required before acting on prophetic and definitive statements such as those 
offered by Williams and Manley. 
Part 1: Core Limitations 
Methodological Issues 
As the legitimacy and meaning of research outcomes are governed by the way they 
were generated, one of our core concerns lies with the approach used by Williams and 
Manley (2014).  More specifically, this relates to the study’s methodological coherence; or 
the level of compatibility across the authors’ epistemological position, research questions, 
participant selection, data collection and data analysis (Mayan, 2009).  Indeed, although the 
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authors adopt an interpretivist epistemology—quite appropriately given their focus on how 
players perceived and attached meaning to the use of technology (Grix, 2010)—it is difficult 
to see the full permeation of this perspective throughout the rest of the data collection and 
analysis.  While different research strategies can be used under different epistemological 
positions, it is difficult to match Williams and Manley’s interpretive lens to these procedures. 
Firstly, under their interpretivist epistemology the authors report use of methods 
outlined by Corbin and Strauss (2008), whose approach is based within a pragmatic research 
philosophy, and Charmaz (2002, 2014), whose approach is based within a constructivist 
epistemology; all of which make different assumptions about the nature of reality and 
knowledge.  We also note that the works by Corbin and Strauss (2008) and Charmaz (2002, 
2014) relate to grounded theory; although this is not explicitly identified by Williams and 
Manley (2014) as their approach.  Tellingly, however, the authors reported that Corbin and 
Strauss’ and Charmaz’s methods ‘facilitated the construction of a theoretical framework’ 
which ‘gave rise to an evolving process of discovering theoretical possibilities that was far 
removed from the mechanical imposition of existing theories’ (p. 6).  Notably, these two 
features are (broadly speaking) cornerstones of grounded theory research (Charmaz, 2014; 
Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Problematically, however, if the authors’ intention was to generate 
a grounded theory then they have overlooked numerous critical conditions for such work.  
Indeed, grounded theory is a full methodology with clear requirements that do not appear (at 
least as presented) in Williams and Manley’s approach.  For example, grounded theory 
methodology uses a recursive approach where data analysis drives on-going sampling and 
data collection and develops a model (usually presented pictorially) of the focal process 
(Charmaz, 2014; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Grounded theorists also search for variation, 
explore multiple and diverse perceptions to generate as detailed a picture as possible on the 
phenomenon under inquiry and strive for theoretical saturation (i.e., when newly acquired 
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data fail to offer new insights or meaning on the already developed results; op cit).  In this 
way, Williams and Manley’s focus on just four purposively sampled players, limited focus on 
the positive features of monitoring and measurement as perceived by these players (see p. 10) 
and omission of other actors without explanation are problematic oversights.  Indeed, the 
authors note in their concluding comments that ‘the conduct of the coaches [in applying 
technology] is assumed to be well intentioned’ (p. 18); which would seem a critical variable 
to confirm empirically given their study’s focus (we will comment more on coach intentions 
later).  As an aside, it would also have been useful for Williams and Manley to account for 
these factors (i.e., small sample size and absent coverage of coach intentions) and the extent 
to which these data are unique to their sample. 
Irrespective of whether the authors aimed to develop a grounded theory or conduct a 
more simple form of inductive analysis, we return to the point that their approach was ‘far 
removed from the mechanical imposition of existing theories’ (p. 6); something which clearly 
fits with an interpretivist epistemology.  However, there is a further degree of uncertainty 
with regards to the input of existing theories and subsequent inconsistencies in their results.  
Taking the former first, and juxtaposing their aim not to impose current theory on their data, 
the authors report in their introduction that ‘to conceptualise our understanding of the 
disciplinary mechanisms, surveillance measures and distribution of power . . . we focus 
predominantly upon the works of Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault’ (p. 2).  Furthermore, 
the authors describe their aim to ‘draw from the Foucauldian concepts of discipline and 
power,’ ‘emphasise the modern age of surveillance and a technological mode of embodiment 
that accentuate the materiality of the individual’ and ‘represent an institution that furthers our 
understanding of power/knowledge relations’ (p. 3).  Of course, the use of pre-identified 
theory to interpret data is often a suitable and insightful approach for research (including, to 
some extent, grounded theory; Charmaz, 2014; Corbin & Strauss, 2008) but only if this is 
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clearly defined and described.  As such, confusion prevails.  Williams and Manley (2014) 
report adherence to an open, ‘bottom-up’ generation of themes within their methodology 
section yet a range of markers (including their own statements) suggest that this analysis was 
far more deductive than their inductive phrasing (e.g., ‘patterns and features emerged,’ p.6), 
processes (e.g., open coding) and citations (e.g., Charmaz, 2014; Corbin & Strauss, 2008) 
would imply. 
Perhaps highlighting this most effectively, the authors’ results provide a clear account 
of issues identified in the introduction.  In this way, the work appears to present a structured 
(rather than serendipitous) confirmation of the principles outlined ‘up front.’  Indeed, this is 
perhaps unsurprising given a purposive approach to sampling that ‘enabled access to a group 
of individuals perceived as most likely to provide an in-depth account [emphasis added] of 
the surveillant practices and disciplinary logic present within the institution under study’ (p. 
5).  In short, it looks like Williams and Manley (2014) found and reported what they set out 
to find and report.  This, of course, is not unusual in scientific studies or even inevitably a 
‘bad’ thing.  However, it does raise doubts over the completeness and pervasiveness of the 
apparent issues that players have with technology.  Indeed, we were startled to see such a 
volume of commentary from other academics’ writing on power, control and surveillance 
around each of the quotes from a Raven’s player rather than a detailed ‘unpacking’ of these 
participants’ interpretations.  This is perhaps most emphatically evidenced when two players 
(half of the sample) reported positive aspects of technology.  Rather than exploring this view 
in full (as we expected given that the authors’ epistemological stance required them to present 
participant interpretations), the possibility that these players were “docile adherents” (p. 10) 
to institutional norms was instead suggested.  Even more concerning, perhaps, Williams and 
Manley then followed with support for their own negative interpretation (i.e., that the players 
were being detrimentally controlled and dehumanised) rather than the players’ actual 
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interpretation which might have stressed a more active and independent role in their 
development! 
In sum, and regardless of whether Williams and Manley (2014) employed a more 
inductive or deductive analysis, the various parts of the stated methodology do not seem to 
match; either with each other or the results.  Also, the extent to which the authors were 
leaders more than ‘partners’ (p. 6) in the research process and final presentation is also an 
apparent issue.  While Williams and Manley present strong claims on the pitfalls of 
technology, the foundations on which these are made therefore seem rather shaky and the 
reader is left unable to sufficiently evaluate the quality of the data collection, analysis and 
ultimate results (see Sparkes & Smith, 2009).  Given their potential to paint a significantly 
different picture, we now consider two of the key conceptual oversights noted in this section 
in more detail. 
Conceptual Oversights 
Coach judgments and decision making.  As acknowledged by Williams and Manley 
(2014), the use of technology to monitor, evaluate and inform practice may often be well 
intentioned and herein lies, as we have implied above, another critical oversight in the 
authors’ work.  To be clear, we do not consider ‘well’ in the previous sentence to refer to 
‘pastoral’ intentions alone but, more broadly, those which are necessary for supporting 
sustained optimal performance in a high level and high pressure environment (indeed, some 
of these may be far from ‘pastoral’; Cruickshank & Collins, 2014).  Either way, the process 
of sports coaching has been defined as one that is largely dependent on decision making 
(Abraham et al., 2006).  As such, coaches must continually strive to get better at making 
effective decisions across short-, medium- and long-term timescales against the goals that 
have been set.  For an elite environment, these goals are likely and understandably focused on 
performance, with pastoral welfare an important but certainly not necessarily primary 
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concern (see Collins & Kamin, 2012, for a critical consideration of such epistemological and 
systematic differences). 
In this context, implementing technology in the way described, as opposed to 
interpreted, can positively supplement such endeavours.  For instance, employing an 
intervention (e.g., a new training structure) based on a model of professional judgement and 
decision making (cf. Martindale & Collins, 2005, 2007) relies on referencing collected 
evidence, including that through technological means, against mechanistic underpinnings 
(i.e., decisions, plans and techniques focused on how performance can be improved).  As 
these mechanisms become understood in greater levels of detail (cf. Newell, Liu, & Mayer-
Kress, 2001), which is the growing case in coaching science (e.g., Carson, Collins, & 
Richards, 2014), technology offers a realistic opportunity to meaningfully track athletes’ 
progress in a way that would otherwise be impossible (e.g., heart rate during performance); 
that is, using key performance indicators (KPIs).  Accordingly, the failure of Williams and 
Manley (2014) to explore (or at least consider in more detail) why management and coaches 
did what they did, leaves a large hole in their presentation against the performance goals 
which can reasonably be inferred as primary in this context (cf. Abraham & Collins, 2011; 
Collins, Burke, Martindale, & Cruickshank, 2015; Winter & Collins, 2015). 
Indeed, when armed with data and a mechanistic understanding, coaches are better 
able to make informed decisions about how (and how not) to act and respond; in short, 
coaches’ intentions, including those relating to the use of technology, are often grounded in 
knowing ‘why’ something works/needs to be done (cf. Collins et al., 2015).  Crucially, 
therefore, regular monitoring is essential when considering the nonlinearity that exists within 
coaching environments (Button, Lee, Mazumder, Tan, & Chow, 2012).  Furthermore, 
decision making efficacy can be enhanced, and we suggest is a hallmark of expert practice, 
by triangulating between related evidence-bases (Anderson, Miles, Mahoney, & Robinson, 
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2002).  In doing so, one must consider and involve the athlete as an active agent within the 
coaching process; their interpretations/meanings assigned to performances are influential for 
success.  As such, self-reported feedback (sometimes via internet communication) can help 
ensure that coaching practice is most constructively aligned to identify problems and modify 
plans as considered necessary (Muir, Morgan, Abraham, & Morley, 2011). 
Accordingly, technological tools are often sensibly employed within elite coaching 
environments because they are able to satisfy the need to plan, predict, monitor and revise 
coaching practice across different timescales.  Of course, and crucially, the deployment of 
measures must be epistemologically coherent with the coaches’ intended 
performance/learning outcomes; unfortunately something not directly explored by Williams 
and Manley (2014), despite explaining that the coach ‘“acts”, “thinks” and “behaves” in 
certain ways that fulfil the brief of being effective’ (p. 9).  On this basis it is only possible to 
speculate about the relevance and impact of the KPIs reported.  However, if the reported 
measures (mainly physiological) are established components of performance success in elite 
rugby, then their use seems reasonably justified.  Indeed, we would suggest that measurement 
and employment of performance data, both outcome and process, has been a feature of high 
level environments since the supplication of the Corinthian ideal! 
There are some other issues of concern which follow logically from the original 
report.  Notably, and in consideration of several comments contained within the interview 
data, it appears that the (apparently 18) KPIs employed were perhaps less than optimal.  As 
an example of this speculation, players reported the coach as saying “we want to measure 
everything we can, if we can measure it we can improve it,” and “anything they [the coaches] 
can make a statistic out of they will” (p. 9).  This finding, coupled with the revelation that 
games were won when KPIs targets were down and lost when exceeding targets, supports 
speculation that KPIs were poorly defined, insufficiently considered or treated (i.e., an overall 
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percentage score derived from all 18 KPIs) and not bought into by those concerned.  
However, this represents poor use of the technology (not as rare as one would think!) rather 
than a questionable and power-focused action by the coaches. 
Accordingly, the use of technology is unlikely to be a fundamental problem within 
elite coaching environments when it supports a coach’s decision making in optimising and 
pushing the limits of elite performance.  Furthermore, technology cannot be accused or 
blamed for coaching outcomes since it is the user that is responsible for its use.  Despite 
Williams and Manley (2014) claiming that their investigation provides ‘a mandate for critical 
reflections gathered in context to develop practical guidelines appreciative of what coaches 
do in their natural settings’ (p. 1), this too warrants debate because the coach’s intentions 
were not established.  While coaches might have been employing technology to create power 
at the Ravens, this cannot be upheld by player perceptions alone, nor that ‘management 
practice[s were] overtly opposed to organic learning procedures’ (p. 10). 
Player empowerment.  With Williams and Manley (2014) so focused on 
emphasising the negative control imposed by surveillance technology on the lives of 
professional rugby players, it is perhaps unsurprising that other positive features of its use 
have been underrepresented.  Specifically, we refer to coaches using data to empower players 
who are taking action and/or continuing their pursuit of a goal.  While Williams and Manley 
argue that technology was being used as a “weapon” (p. 4), whereby data were ‘presented to 
steer a myriad of analytical truths’ (p. 7) and to create and exert a ‘climate of control’ (p. 2), 
it is equally possible that the same act can serve the opposite effect; in short, ‘one man’s 
power is another’s support.’  Indeed, as is fleetingly mentioned within the interview data, half 
of the participants revealed that quantifying performances could be beneficial for individual 
development.  It is a shame that further exploration of these benefits were not explored, since 
in this respect it would appear that the perception of intent was not authoritarian. 
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On the issue of providing numeric augmented feedback, coaches have long provided 
data to performers in sometimes questionable ways; for instance, gymnasts being weighed 
every day, undergoing monthly ‘fat tests’ (as also reported by one of the rugby players) and 
having these data publicly displayed on the gym wall (e.g., Kerr & Dacyshyn, 2000).  As 
such, we do not view the publication of individual KPIs as being particularly new (or 
inherently problematic) within elite coaching environments.  In contrast, Williams and 
Manley (2014) explain these practices as an ‘unremitting form of micro-management’ (p. 15) 
in order to “police” players and ‘alleviate the threat of [collective] resistance’ (p. 14); 
presumably their belief is that this ‘villainous’ activity was not (or less) apparent prior to the 
‘technology boom.’  Given that these practices existed many decades ago, however, it 
certainly is not the responsibility of Microsoft as the article title and one participant rugby 
player suggest (cf. earlier comments on how tools are used versus what they objectively do). 
In support of the notion that data can empower athletes to take action, one player in 
Williams and Manley’s (2014) study reported that statistics were displayed to let you “know 
whether you are working as hard as you can” (p. 14).  To put the severity of negative claims 
made by Williams and Manley into further context, working hard and peer evaluation, even 
performance related pay, is a common requirement of many professions.  Take for example 
doctors and nurses being on night call following a shift, or dare we say academics working 
late into the evening to complete grant proposals on top of their teaching and writing duties 
against performance markers such as the REF!  While we appreciate that the development of 
many (if not all) athletes is rooted in principles of amateurism (e.g., fun and health benefits), 
the reality is that elite sport is highly competitive and expensive to operationalise, whereby 
the expectations placed on players are somewhat more ‘geared’ towards objective success.  In 
return, professionals are paid to achieve both personal and collective success.  Accordingly, it 
Suggested Running head: PERFORMANCE DATA IN SPORT                                            13 
 
does not seem ‘anti-pastoral’ to suggest that adherence to such high performing behaviours, 
and taking responsibility for achieving them, must be recognised as part of the job. 
As further contrast to Williams and Manley’s (2014) interpretation that power was 
uniformly exercised over players, consider recent case study data from another premiership 
rugby club provided by Cruickshank, Collins, and Minten (2013).  In this environment, the 
director of rugby and the head coach used extensive monitoring and evaluation tools to 
facilitate performance-optimising behaviours within their squad.  Consider the following 
quotes from one interviewed player which paint a somewhat different picture to that offered 
by Williams and Manley: 
While some players detested training with heart rate monitors in every pre-season 
session, this condition was recognised as a “small way of getting the best out of 
people because they won’t slack off [as] they can tell how hard you are working.” 
They will show us the [statistics from the] last game: “Look boys you hit 
eighty-five [per cent tackle success rate] there, this week you hit eighty-eight and you 
just lost; next week if we hit ninety we’ll be there” . . . . And then you can break that 
down individually . . . . If you can give positive information in that sort of way it’s 
easier for boys to digest and jump on board with the message that we are going in the 
right direction. (Cruickshank et al., 2013, p. 283) 
As shown, the recording and subsequent use of multiple forms of data against explicitly 
understood beliefs provided meaningful value to this player and promoted accountability, 
empowerment and cohesiveness within the group.  Underpinned by the leaders’ prioritisation 
of player clarity, the views in Williams and Manley might have therefore arrived via a limited 
presentation of rationale; that is, poor understanding of what data practically mean and what 
is needed to change them.  With efficiency in the rugby club being ‘numerically mapped out 
for [emphasis added] the players’ (p. 7), it might be that the levels of self-driven engagement 
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were insufficient.  In short, elite culture does not have to be, and may not have uniformly 
been at the Ravens, as Williams and Manley suggest. 
Part 2: An Alternative Coaching Perspective 
Although we do not necessarily disagree with some of the concerns raised by 
Williams and Manley (2014), the interpretation of data from a sociological perspective 
affords the opportunity to discuss several other pertinent issues which emerged from players’ 
quotes.  Of course, and as we have stressed throughout, there is every possibility that the use 
of technology might represent coaches’ attempts to exercise ‘institutional power’ (p. 11) over 
players, but this only might be the case.  Accordingly, in the following section we highlight 
issues presented from another, perhaps equally as concerning, perspective grounded within 
coaching and other literature. 
Problematic Natural Heuristics 
 With the use of technology rapidly expanding in Western societies, it only seems 
natural to seek out its potential advantages in performance domains.  As such, being drawn to 
employ technology is not necessarily bad in itself (as explained by our earlier point); rather, 
the negative issue arises when measures cannot support the required training or when these 
measures solely dictate the training.  In other words, coaches suffer from the impression that 
‘if you cannot measure it then it is not important’ or ‘if you can measure it then it is 
important.’  Indeed, this might be referred to as a machines that go ‘ping’ effect, whereby the 
coach places greater value on, and therefore insists on more frequent employment of, such 
means to generate (apparently) objective data.  Consequently, there runs a realistic danger in 
these situations that training regimes become misbalanced, leading to unproductive outcomes 
when considering the actual performer’s needs.  For example, consider the following account 
from recently retired Irish rugby player Brian O’Driscoll: 
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Their [younger players] [weightlifting] technique is phenomenal but it is as if they are 
winning if they have great scores in the gym.  It’s not, they’re rugby players . . . . 
[Weightlifting] is only one aspect.  You have got to be aerobically very fit and you 
have to have very good skills.  I don’t just know if that balance is there at the moment 
. . . .  I can see that at the academies in Ireland, where there is a huge focus on scores 
in the weights room, as opposed to whether they can throw a 10-metre pass on the 
run.  They should be rugby players becoming athletes, not athletes becoming rugby 
players . . . .  I don’t think the gym-monkey thing applies to them [New Zealand 
players] as much as it does over here.  There is way more of a focus in New Zealand 
from an early age on skills.  They do everything with a ball.  They do all their fitness 
work with a ball and that’s why they have better skill levels.  That’s where New 
Zealand have the balance, they have that physicality but they are able to mix their 
game up. (Schofield, 2014) 
Unfortunately, this effect is probably more common than one would like to imagine, 
since human beings possess a natural heuristic for ‘objectivity’ regardless of the predictive 
accuracy, especially when information is easily available (Kahneman, 2011).  Indeed, even 
when decision makers are aware that the evidence is insufficiently valid they continue to 
employ such bias (termed ‘illusion of validity’; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1126).  This 
argument compliments that of Williams and Manley (2014) when highlighting the 
questionable ‘side effects’ of coaches who become ‘overly seduced by objectifying 
performance’ (p. 4), however not only for sociological reasons.  In this case, it may be that 
the coach is overusing a heuristic which simply does not resonate positively with several of 
the players.  What we mean by this is that players might not be portraying the severity of 
problem accurately (i.e., they might have an unjustified grudge towards the coaching staff) 
and/or that the extent of technology employed was justified but that the measures were just 
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not good enough.  In other words, using machines that go ‘ping’ for the right reasons and at 
the right times might have had a more positive impact with the players.  Of course, we are 
very much aware of the difficulties involved in providing performance analysis and the 
challenges faced in this emerging field (cf. Wright, Carling, & Collins, 2014).  However, 
surely this should act to drive research to more positively address players’ needs rather than 
dismiss it outright?  
Too Many Cooks? 
From a more general perspective, there exists a dangerous reality that practitioners are 
also required, or at least feel compelled to, justify and demonstrate their contribution to the 
‘performance pie’ in their multi or interdisciplinary team (Reid, Stewart, & Thorne, 2004).  
According to the interview data in Williams and Manley (2014), one player mentioned that at 
least five coaches and analysts fed data back to the head coach and that during play “you 
have 4 coaches sitting there with the manuals, maul unfolds and they think right, what wasn’t 
perfect about that, . . . the whole shebang” (p. 9).  Furthermore, data were spread across 
‘mobile surveillance sites’ (p. 15) and thus emphasises the portable and varied nature of 
information collection at the Ravens.  Indeed, this problem is almost inevitable when clubs 
employ too many ‘ologists,’ or work with too many sport institutes; each competing to have 
their contribution recognised and voice heard (cf. Collins, 2008).  Therefore, as diverse 
technology becomes increasingly applied to sport performance, coaches will need to 
understand and focus more on the crucial mechanisms that are accurate and most informative 
towards the task at hand.  Once again, this will not be an easy challenge since it is difficult 
for individuals to depart from a strongly held view, even when it is to be replaced by one with 
a strong evidence base (Yarritu, Matute, & Luque, 2015). 
Summary 
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In summary, this article has responded to a concerning issue raised by Williams and 
Manley (2014); namely, that of technology being overused within the elite coaching 
environment.  While we do not disagree that a level of concern is warranted when technology 
is being mis/overused, we have highlighted several limitations of Williams and Manley’s 
study to suggest that such alarm has perhaps been raised prematurely, inappropriately and on 
somewhat shaky foundations; particularly given that these inferences are taken from a 
handful of players in a single rugby club.  Indeed, the interpretation of data from such a small 
sample, in combination with a questionable methodology and fundamental conceptual 
oversights, suggests some amount of distortion between what was reported by the players and 
what the authors think.  Having presented several arguments in support of using technology 
in elite sports coaching, it would be good to see greater coverage of the issues’ impact within 
the club structure.  On the basis of our counter arguments to reducing/limiting the use of 
technology within the coaching environment, our simple message to coaches is to think 
carefully about what technology is employed, how and why, and then to ensure that these 
decisions are discussed with and, preferably, sold to players.  Certainly, technology carries 
great potential to enhance coach decision making and practice, while also helping players to 
become more focussed, empowered and independent in knowing how to achieve their 
personal and collective goals.
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